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WHO ARE CREDITORS IN A REORGANIZATION
PROCEEDING?
F. J. MOREAUt
A. Creditors entitled to join in a petition for the reorganization
of a debtor corporation
The word "creditor" is specifically defined in the very first
section of the Bankruptcy Act. A creditor is a person owning a
debt, demand, or claim provable in bankruptcy.1 Accordingly, a
complete knowledge of the term as defined can be obtained only
by getting a thorough understanding of the nature of provable
claims as provided by Congress. 2 Gradually, the number of prov-
able claims has been increased both by amendment of the act,3
and judicial interpretation. 4 Still a creditor remains under the
statute a person having a provable claim.-
t Ph.B., University of Wisconsin, 1922; LL.B., 1924; LL.M., Columbia
University, 1937. Dean, University of Kansas Law School.
1. 11 U. S. C. A. (1927) sec. 1 (9). Now (1938) 52 Stat. 841, c. 575,
11 U. S. C. A. (1939) sec. 1 (11).
2. Bankruptcy Act (1898) 30 Stat. 562, c. 541, sec. 63, 11 U. S. C. A.
(1927) see. 103.
3. Subdivisions 6, 61/, and 7 were added to this section by Congress,
June 7, 1934, 48 Stat. 923, c. 424, and June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 991, c. 580.
4. Maynard v. Elliott (1931) 283 U. S. 273; Williams v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1915) 236 U. S. 549; Central Trust Co. v. Chi-
cago Auditorium Ass'n (1916) 240 U. S. 581; Irving Trust Co. v. A. W.
Perry, Inc. (1934) 293 U. S. 307.
5. American Surety Co. v. Marotta (1933) 287 U. S. 513. Lawyers
argued that the word "creditor" had the meaning given it by statute
throughout bankruptcy proceedings, wherever used. This argument was
overthrown when the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
word "creditor" as used in relation to the Acts of Bankruptcy (1898) 30
Stat. 544, c. 541, in sec. 3 A (1), should be given the meaning usually
attributed to it in the law of fraudulent conveyances, rather than the mean-
ing given to it by specific statutory definition. The net result is that the
term as used in sec. 3 A (1) has a broader meaning than as defined in
sec. 1 (9). (Now sec. 1 (11) of the Chandler Act (1938) 52 Stat. 841,
c. 575, 11 U. S. C. A. (1939) sec. 1 (11)). The case involved the question
whether a debtor had committed an act of bankruptcy in transferring
property with intent to hinder or delay creditors if such creditors did not
have provable claims. The Court answered the question affirmatively. This
reasoning in departing from what may be termed the "letter" of the statute
is a fine example of purposive interpretation. Congress must have intended
to give a "creditor" as recognized in the law of fraudulent conveyances the
additional remedy of filing an involuntary petition in bankruptcy upon
making his claim provable, even though not provable at the time of the
fraudulent conveyance. It refused to say that the statutory word "include"
in the definition of creditor also meant "exclude." In other words the Court
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Section 77B defined the term "creditors" more broadly.0 The
concept therein was much more inclusive than its meaning in a
regular proceeding in bankruptcy. It included claimants having
claims against the debtor or its property. Holders of vested in-
terests in the debtor's property are not affected by regular bank-
ruptcy proceedings. But in a reorganization proceeding which
aims to preserve the debtor's property intact instead of liquidat-
ing it, a different technique is essential.7 All claimants should be
refused to follow the rule of interpretation which says that if the legisla-
ture enumerates, it thereby excludes all things not included. To apply such
rule would have defeated the Congressional purpose.
6. Bankruptcy Act (1934) 48 Stat. 911, c. 424, sec. 77 B (b) (10), 11
U. S. C. A. (1937) sec. 207 (b) 10. "The term 'creditors' shall include
for all purposes of this section and of the reorganization plan, its acceptance
and confirmation, all holders of claims of whatever character against the
debtor or its property, including claims under executory contracts, whether
or not such claims would otherwise constitute provable claims under this
Act. The term 'claims' includes debts, securities, other than stock, liens,
or other interests of whatever character. For all purposes of this section
unsecured claims which would have been entitled to priority over existing
mortgages if a receiver in equity of the property of the debtor had been
appointed by a Federal court on the day of the approval of the petition
or answer under this section, shall be entitled to such priority, and the
holders of such claims, and of other claims, if any, of equal rank, shall be
treated as a separate class of creditors. In case an executory contract or
unexpired lease of real estate shall be rejected pursuant to direction of thejudge given in a proceeding instituted under this section, or shall have been
rejected by a trustee or receiver in bankruptcy or receiver in equity, in a
proceeding pending prior to the institution of a proceeding under this sec-
tion any person injured by such rejection shall, for all purposes of this
section and of the reorganization plan, its acceptance and confirmation, be
deemed to be a creditor. The claim of a landlord for injury resulting from
the rejection of an unexpired lease of real estate or for damages or in-
demnity under a covenant contained in such lease shall be treated as a
claim ranking on a parity with debts which would be provable under sec-
tion 63 (a) of this Act, but shall be limited to an amount not to exceed
the rent, without acceleration, reserved by said lease for the three years
next succeeding the date of surrender of the premises to the landlord or the
date of reentry of the landlord, whichever first occurs, whether before or
after the filing of the petition, plus unpaid rent accrued up to such date
of surrender or reentry: Provided, That the court shall scrutinize the cir-
cumstances of an assignment of future rent claims and the amount of the
consideration paid for such assignment in determining the amount of dam-
ages allowed assignee hereunder. In the case of secured claims entitled to
the provisions of clause (5) of this subdivision (b), the value of the security
shall be determined in the manner provided in section 57, clause (h) of
this Act, and if the amount of such value shall be less than the amount
of the claim, the excess may be classified as an unsecured claim. The pro-
visions of section 60 of this Act shall apply to claims against the debtor
in a proceeding under this Section." Foust v. Munson S. S. Lines (1936)
299 U. S. 77.
7. In re Draco Realty Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1935) 11 F. Supp. 405.
For such purposes as filing claims, voting on plans, and sharing in the
newly organized company, a right in rem, an interest in the property of
the debtor, is sufficient to give the claimant the status of a creditor.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss1/3
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harmonized to the purpose. Unsympathetic claimants are in-
clined to embarrass those seeking to stabilize the slipping struc-
ture and within Constitutional limitations should not be per-
mitted to do so.
The portion of section 77B cited above stated that the word
was to have this broad meaning "for all the purposes of this
section." But the Chandler Act adds, "when not inconsistent
with the context." The question arises whether any creditor
within the language quoted is qualified to join in the filing of a
creditors' petition. Section 77B (a) provided that such creditors
must have provable claims., The Chandler Act however allows
"creditors" having claims aggregating $5000 or over, liquidated
as to amount and not contingent as to liability, to file petitions.
The exercise of the judicial function in the interpretation of
this portion of section 77B caused the courts some difficulties.9
The problem was always to ascertain what was the necessary
relation between debtor and claimant. Necessarily the cases
available construe the provisions of section 77B. The Chandler
Act, obviously, further limits the right to file petitions.
The status of a mortgagee of property in relation to a pur-
chaser (debtor in reorganization) of the equity of redemption
8. Bankruptcy Act (1934) 48 Stat. 913, c. 424, see. 77B (a), 11 U. S.
C. A. (1937) sec. 207 (a) provided" * * * Three or more creditors who have
provable claims against any corporation which amount in the aggregate, in
excess of the value of securities held by them, if any, to $1,000 or over
may, if such corporation has not filed a petition or answer under this sec-
tion, file with the court in which such corporation might file a petition
under this section, a petition stating that such corporation is insolvent or
unable to meet its debts as they mature and, if a prior proceeding in bank-
ruptcy or equity receivership is not pending, that it has committed an act
of bankruptcy within four months, that such creditors propose that it shall
effect a reorganization; * * * " Cf. see. 1 (9) of the Bankruptcy Act,
11 U. S. C. A. (1927) see. 1 (9). "'Creditor' shall include anyone who
owns a demand or claim provable in bankruptcy, and may include his duly
authorized agent, attorney, or proxy." Examine sec. 63 of the Bankruptcy
Act, which defines provable claims. Does it limit the meaning of subdivi-
sion (a) of sec. 77B? See Mount Forest Fur Farms of America v. Farns-
worth (C. C. A. 6, 1937) 92 F. (2d) 342, for a literal application of the
statute, and a holding that a provable claim is necessary. See also In re
Draco Realty Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1935) 11 F. Supp. 405, in which
the court contrasts the two types of creditors. A mortgagee of property is
not a creditor of the mortgagor's grantee so as to be able to file a petition
against him.
9. Bryan v. Welsh (C. C. A. 10, 1934) 72 F. (2d) 618, (C. C. A. 10,
1935) 74 F. (2d) 964. In this opinion, the court quotes Bogert, Tinsts
(1921) 16, distinguishing a debt from a trust. Guardian Trust Co. v.
Studdert (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) 36 S. W. (2d) 578, 582; Thornburg v.
Buck (1895) 13 Ind. App. 446, 41 N. E. 85, 86.
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from the mortgagor where such buyer has not assumed the debt,
presents one manifestation of the problem squarely. In In re
Draco Realty Corporation,0 the Winfred Realty Corporation,
owning the Drake Hotel in New York City, mortgaged it to the
Chase National Bank for the sum of $3,750,000. A few months
later the mortgagor corporation conveyed to the Draco Realty
Corporation, debtor, all of this real property, the purchaser not
assuming the payment of the bond. Subsequently the debtor filed
a petition for reorganization. The court pointed out that the
statute describes two types of creditors: those with provable
claims, and those having mere interests in the property of the
debtor. For the purpose of joining in the filing of petitions
creditors must have provable claims against the debtor, and it
is not enough that they have an interest in its property. In order
to qualify as a creditor for this purpose the mortgagee must be
entitled to a deficiency judgment against the debtor. A creditor
for this purpose, then, is one who could qualify as such within
the meaning of the old bankruptcy act. He must have a provable
claim. The mortgagee in the Draco case was not such a creditor.
Not long after the enactment of section 77B, in Bryan v.
Welsh,"'- some holders of certificates of beneficial interest in a
business trust sought to file a petition as creditors under the
statute. Viewing the relationship of these certificate holders to
the business as analogous to the relationship between stock-
holders and their corporation, the court held that they were
equitable owners of the property, proprietors, and not creditors,
and therefore not entitled to file an involuntary petition against
the debtor. The fact that some of the certificates of interest
provided for preferences both as to income payments and as to
assets in case of dissolution did not suffice to raise the relation-
ship to that of debtor-creditor. It seems unnecessary to cite cases
in support of the well-established doctrine that a stockholder
of a corporation is not a creditor thereof.22 The rule applies
to preferred stock as well as to common.13 Even where preferred
10. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1935) 11 F. Supp. 405.
11. (C. C. A. 10, 1935) 74 F. (2d) 964, 971.
12. 13 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations (1932) see. 5755; Bryan v.
Welsh (C. C. A. 10, 1935) 964, 970.
13. Inscho v. Mid-continent Development Co. (1915) 94 Kan. 370, 383,
385, Ann. Cas. 1917B 588; Miller v. Ratterman (1890) 47 Ohio St. 141, 24
N. E. 496; Note (1894) 27 L. R. A. 136; Note (1899) 73 Am. St. Rep. 227.
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stock has matured and is due and payable several months prior
to the date of the filing of a petition for a reorganization, it is
improper to allow such stockholders to share in the assets of the
debtor as creditors. 14 The courts support this conclusion by
giving emphasis to the Congressional intent clearly appearing
from the fact that the word "stock" is excluded from the statu-
tory definition of "claims." Yet under the statutes of the State
of Michigan, where the debtor in the Bryan case had been or-
ganized, it was legal for the stockholder to demand and receive
full payment on such claims. Hence the federal courts have been
severe in denying strict legal rights in the interest of equities
arising out of the circumstances. This probably amounts to more
than a mere disregard of form. Strong support for this view
was available from a decision of the judges of the Seventh
Circuit. In In re Piccadilly Realty Co., 5 the holders of matured
preferred stock, entitled to dividends past-due thereon, sought
to file a petition as creditors under section 77B. They were not
permitted to do so, the court holding that the stock ownership in
a corporation cannot be said to create a creditor-debtor arrange-
ment, regardless of the statutory or stipulated rights or privi-
leges provided for in the stock certificate. Probably this is too
careless a reliance upon the mere word "stock." Mere language
can lead to erroneous results. The court's language was broader
than the facts called for. The case is not authority for the
proposition that dividends declared out of existing surplus may
not give rise to a valid debtor-creditor relationship, for the facts
show that there was no surplus nor profits out of which dividends
might have been paid, and accordingly the promise to pay them
was unenforceable. 6 Had there been such a surplus available at
the time of the declaration a different result might have been
proper. In fact, this proposition was upheld in a subsequent
case.
7
14. In re Arcadia Furniture Co. (D. C. W. D. Mich. 1935) 12 F. Supp.
477. The corporate debtor was a Michigan corporation, and under the
Michigan statutes it was lawful for the holder of such shares of stock as
were involved in this case to demand payment in full of the stock and
accumulated dividends at maturity.
15. (C. C. A. 7, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 257.
16. In In re Piccadilly Realty Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 257,
it was held that a stockholder to whom a dividend was declared when no
earnings were available is neither a creditor nor an owner to that extent.
Such a declaration of dividends is of no legal significance.
17. Bryan v. Welsh (C. C. A. 10, 1935) 74 F. (2d) 964, 970, and cases
there cited; 11 Fletcher, Cyclopedi of Corporations (1932) sec. 5324.
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A more difficult situation arises where the stock is convertible
into bonds or other securities. Conversion privileges enable
stockholders to change rather easily their relationship to the
debtor. The change from the status of proprietor to that of
creditor can be effected with little effort. The coat of a different
color is easy to put on. And if the debtor is a failure, the new
coat is much more comfortable. In a federal case arising in
Kentucky, 18 it was held that such a conversion would not protect
holders of such bonds as against the claims of unsecured credi-
tors. The decision was rested upon the Kentucky statutes and
upon general equitable limitations upon statutory rights and
powers. The underlying thought or policy was to protect true
creditors as against claimants, who, having begun as true stock-
holders, then decided to become creditors when the unsecured
claims had increased in amount to a point at which the equity
of proprietorship seemed to be vanishing. They had detected the
handwriting on the wall. It is possible, however, that a contrary
logical decision could be arrived at in other jurisdictions. Care
must be exercised to distinguish cases in which only stockholders
are involved from those in which creditors are injured by the
conversion. One thing is certain; attempts to shift from the
status of proprietor to that of creditor should be carefully scrut-
inized.
The freedom with which courts have exercised their judicial
function in this respect is well brought out in In re Philadelphia
Rapid Trawnsit Co.'9 The court looked through form to reality in
18. In re Phoenix Hotel Co. (D. C. E. D. Ky. 1935) 13 F. Supp. 229,
aff'd (C. C. A. 6, 1936) 83 F. (2d) 724. In this case the certificates of
preferred stock specifically provided that the shares of stock might be
converted at the election of the holder into first refunding and improvement
bonds secured by a first mortgage. In 1932 the company became heavily
indebted, and in 1933 and 1934 many holders of both first and second pre-
ferred stock exchanged their stock for bonds according to the terms of
their respective certificates. Holders of unsecured notes naturally objected
to the alleged prior liens of these old stockholders. The judge handled the
question solely as one involving the Kentucky laws and the public policy
of that state, finding no federal question involved. Accordingly, the judge
analyzed the Kentucky statutes and the Kentucky decisions and arrived at
the conclusion that while the statute permitted a corporation the right to
arrange for the conversion of stocks into bonds or other obligations of the
corporation, such power is limited by other statutes with respect to the
reduction of capital and by the general policy of the state as revealed by
the judicial opinions of such state; that before a corporation may be gen-
erous to its stockholders it must first be just to its creditors.
19. (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 51.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss1/3
1940] CREDITORS IN REORGANIZATION PROCEEDING 33
deciding that holders of bonds could not file a petition, because
they had purchased their bonds, and filed their petition, not in
"good faith," as required by the statute, but for the purpose of
effecting a change in the debtor's management. The decision has
not been commented upon, nor has a similar situation arisen
since. The case shows how far the statute authorizes the courts
to probe into the petitioners' frame of mind.
B. Creditors entitled to participate in reorganizations.
We pass now to the consideration of the more important phase
of our problem. What persons are entitled to share in the reor-
ganized business? Who can be compelled to participate? The
statute, at this point, is a great leveller. It lumps into one group
all persons having claims against the debtor or its property ex-
cept stockholders. All are creditors. In a regular bankruptcy
proceeding, persons having valid claims on the debtor's property
are not disturbed. Section 67d of the old Act provided for such
security. Likewise, in compositions under the old section 12, the
agreement involved only the unsecured claimants. The new pro-
visions of the Act designed for the relief of debtors are more
inclusive and bring together all persons who in some manner
or other are associated in a business unit which is financially
embarrassed. It is not uncommon for some persons to oppose
the levelling process. Some claimants desire to free themselves
from the statutory grouping. The judicial function must re-
solve these conflicting claims.
The statutory policy is similar to the English practice of
recognizing the interests of all types of claimants. It is true that
for many years the English courts placed reorganization burdens
upon investors, insisting that the utmost damage that could be
done to the claims of true creditors was their postponement.
But today they permit all claimants to participate fully. They
have given the word "creditor" a very broad meaning solely by
judicial interpretation. 2 Similarly, the Supreme Court of the
United States21 has given full force and effect to the broad, all-
inclusive language of section 77B. After restating the object of
20. In re Midland Coal and Iron Co. [1895] 1 Ch. 267; Sovereign Life
Assur. Co. v. Dodd [1892] 2 Q. B. 573.
21. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co. (1937) 299 U. S.
433.
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the statute as including a purpose to discharge all demands,
executory and contingent, as well as presently due or to mature
in the future, the Court went on to emphasize the Congressional
language, and held that all claims for damages or indemnities
arising out of the termination of a lease after initiation of pro-
ceedings for reorganization are provable.22 The statute calls for
full participation by all persons having claims against either the
debtor or its property.
The reorganization statute provides for creditor control too,
an idea not new to courts of the United States. Creditors have
controlled regular bankruptcy proceedings and have always taken
an active part in the liquidation process. They examine the
debtor and elect the trustee.23 Moreover, the rule of Northern
Pacific Ry. v. Boyd24 is thoroughly imbedded in our thinking.
Under this decision a reorganization plan that fails to give credi-
tors a position superior to stockholders is unfair and should not
be cofirmed. And it is now fairly clear that in most situations,
the rule of that case will be applied to a considerable degree in
reorganization cases under the new statutes.21 Both the Ameri-
can and English practices reveal an underlying desire to protect
the creditor. In England, originally, he was protected by the
court's refusing to tamper with his claims except to the extent
of their postponement. In the United States the courts tamper
with the claims and alter them, but aim to give the creditor
control over the property of the debtor. At all events, the status
of a creditor in the American courts is far superior to that of a
proprietor. The rights of the latter may be eliminated entirely,
and should be eliminated upon a finding of insolvency. In fact
22. Many other judicial opinions have emphasized the willingness of the
courts to admit claimants with great freedom.
23. See secs. 7, 44, 21, of the Bankruptcy Act.
24. (1913) 228 U. S. 482.
25. The Downtown Inv. Ass'n v. Boston Metropolitan Bldgs. (C. C. A.
1, 1936) 81 F. (2d) 314; In re New York Rys. (C. C. A. 2, 1936) 82 F.
(2d) 739, cert. den. (1936) 298 U. S. 687; In re Peyton Realty Co. (D. C.
E. D. Pa. 1936) 18 F. Supp. 822, 824; In re Witherbee Court Corp. (C. C.
A. 2, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 251, 254. The net result of these decisions is that
the Boyd case will not be followed rigidly, but it will nevertheless furnish
a rough rule of thumb or pattern by which to determine whether a plan
is proper. See also In re Barclay Park Corp. (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 90 F.
(2d) 595; Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co. (C. C. A. 4,
1937) 91 F. (2d) 827; In re Day & Meyer, Murray & Young (C. C. A. 2,
1938) 93 F. (2d) 657. The leading case is the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion of Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co. (1939) 308 U. S. 106.
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he may be eliminated so completely that he may not even com-
plain of the objectionable features of proposed plans. 26
Creditors are not proprietors in the strict sense. Their posi-
tion is adverse to those whose interests are limited to what
remains after creditors' claims have been satisfied. Like proprie-
tors, however, bondholders are investors27 who have linked them-
selves to a business concern. The assumed risks may be different.
The secured creditor is an investor who was careful enough to
reduce his risk of loss by taking a lien upon his debtor's prop-
erty. He has less to worry about than the general unsecured
creditor. Normally what the secured claimant desires is freedom
of action in respect to his security and the right to dispose of it
to the best possible advantage to himself. In general, the holder
of a valid lien has such a right. Under the common law title
theory the lienholder becomes the absolute owner of the prop-
erty on default, and even under the lien theory he can take the
property subject, perhaps, to the equities of the debtor, but
nevertheless free to secure to himself the payment of his claim.8
This is permitted in a regular bankruptcy proceeding. Liens are
given full recognition and claims are paid in the order of their
priorities. Throughout the American experience in reorganiza-
tions pursuant to the equity receivership, the courts were con-
stantly confronted with the absolute right of the lienholders to
have the value of their rights determined by a judicial sale of
the propertyY' Thus, until the passage of legislation for the
relief of debtors in 1933 and 1934, vested property rights were
never altered without the consent of the owners of such prop-
erty. There could be compositions in bankruptcy, regular bank-
ruptcy proceedings, and receivership proceedings aimed at re-
organizations, but these were mere harmless storms or gentle
winds over the stable vested rights. The new legislation, in
providing for the alteration of the rights of secured creditors,
has ushered in a new principle. It cuts across a large number of
26. In re New York Rys. (C. C. A. 2, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 739, comment
(1936) 36 Col. L. Rev. 1166.
27. The early English practice was to look to both bond and shareholders
as investors to charge with the responsibility of effecting successful reor-
ganizations.
28. The first Frazier-Lemke Act was declared unconstitutional because
it denied the mortgagee the right to the property without providing for full
payment of the debt. Louisville Bank v. Radford (1935) 295 U. S. 555.
29. First Nat'l Bank v. Flershem (1934) 290 U. S. 504.
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our common law doctrines. Secured creditors are less free to act
with reference to their liens than heretofore. Some of their
rights must yield if the paramount purpose of Congress to pre-
serve the economic benefits which inhere in going-concern values
is to be realized. To permit secured creditors to take away
their properties would be destructive of those very values which
a reorganization aims to preserve. The broad statutory defini-
tion of the term "creditor" evinces a clear Congressional intent
to gather and hold together persons interested in the property
of the debtor.
It seems logical here to consider how a court is to determine
what types of interests in the debtor's property, if any, are
severable from the rest of its property, notwithstanding the
broad statutory purposes. What property rights will entitle
their owner to free himself completely from the risks of a re-
organization? Not long after section 77B had been passed the
question arose whether a conditional seller of machinery which
became part and parcel of the assets of a corporate debtor as a
going concern should be entitled to take possession of such
equipment and dispose of it according to the regular procedure
evolved under the recognized legal principles pursuant to which
conditional sales are made. It is well settled that a conditional
seller may repossess himself of the subject of the contract upon
default, even against a buyer who has filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy.30 So the question arose whether these accepted rules of
law should be discarded in favor of a ruling more consistent with
the Congressional intent and purpose to maintain the going
concern values of a failing corporate debtor. It would not be
difficult to contend that, within the meaning of the act, assets
obtained by conditional sale, if used by a corporate debtor, are
"property of the debtor." The risk of loss of such property is
on the buyer,". and the promise to pay for the property is abso-
lute in the sense that it is not cancelled merely because the
property is returned.32 In case such property is damaged, con-
verted, or otherwise subjected to tortious acts, the buyer is a
30. 5 Remington, Bankmptcy (4th ed. 1936) sec. 2455.
31. Uniform Conditional Sales Act, sec. 27; 2 Uniform Laws Ann. 40,
and cases cited; 2A Uniform Laws Ann. 196-199; O'Neil-Adams Co. v.
Eklund (1915) 89 Conn. 232, 93 Ati. 524, Ann. Cas. 1918D 379.
32. 2A Uniform Laws Ann. 196; La Valley v. Ravenna (1905) 78 Vt.
152, 155, 62 Atl. 47, 6 Ann. Cas. 684, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 97.
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real party in interest entitled to maintain an action.3 3 The title
of the seller is said to be retained solely for security purposes.34
A conditional seller's frame of mind is that of a seller rather
than an owner. He hopes that he will never see the property sold
again, and if he does repossess the article, it will be solely for
the purpose of enforcing the payment of the debt, to secure
which he retained legal title. Accordingly, when the earmarks
of a contract of conditional sale are noted it can be assimilated
well, if not exactly, to the chattel mortgage. Yet the chattel
mortgagee must stay with the business ship even though it is on
the verge of sinking. He is not entitled to destroy the going-
concern values by foreclosure proceedings. What should a court
do in the exercise of its judicial function in passing upon a con-
ditional seller's petition for reclamation of property as to which
he has retained the legal title, upon the default of the buyer?
Should the rules of law with reference to conditional sales as
administered in state courts and in regular bankruptcy proceed-
ings prevail against the above analysis so as to prevent the
Congressional purposes from being realized?
The problem has been carefully studied in a few cases. Of four
District Judges who have written opinions upon the question,
two35 have permitted the seller to retake his property while the
two others36 took the opposite view. One of the decisions in
favor of the seller was appealed and the judgment was affirmed.37
Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States denied a writ
of certiorari.38 It appears as if the rules of law relative to con-
33. Stotts v. Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co. (1917) 94 Wash.
339, 162 Pac. 519, L. R. A. 1917D 214.
34. Ibid. See also Osborn v. South Shore Lumber Co. (1895) 91 Wis.
526, 65 N. W. 184.
35. In In re Ideal Laundry, Inc. (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1935) 10 F. Supp.
719, the judge said the seller was an owner rather than a creditor. In re
Lake's Laundry, Inc. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1935) 11 F. Supp. 237, aff'd (C. C.
A. 2, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 326, 102 A. L. R. 247 (Learned Hand dissenting),
cert. den. (1935) 296 U. S. 622. See also In re Pointer Brewing Co. (C.
C. A. 8, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 478, giving the seller the right to reclaim even
though his conditional sales contract was not recorded as required by state
law.
36. In re Burgmeister Brewing Co. (D. C. S. D. Ill. 1935) 11 F. Supp.
902; In re Brown (D. C. D. Me. 1936) 14 F. Supp. 251. The court relied
on two grounds: (1) Lack of record; (2) The theory that debtor's right to
redeem is a property right.
37. In re Lake's Laundry, Inc. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 326 (L.
Hand dissenting).
38. Ibid., cert. den. (1935) 296 U. S. 622.
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ditional sales are being carried bodily into reorganization pro-
ceedings. These regular rules are evolved from two factual
situations. In one of these, only the rights of the vendor and
vendee are involved. In the other, the rival claimants are the
bona fide purchaser from the vendee and the conditional seller.
A bona fide purchaser occupies a favored position in the legal
tradition and of course, if a seller prevails over such a favored
claimant, his position is extremely desirable. It is hardly neces-
sary to call attention to the fact that the situation in reorganiza-
tions is very different from the usual situation in conditional
sale transactions. Numerous claimants, stockholders, and even
the public are vitally interested in reorganizations. The Con-
gressional purpose in passing the reorganization statute evi-
dences the public need for rehabilitating financially embarrassed
debtor-corporations. It is significant that the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals divided on the issue.'9 The majority were
restrained by the words "legal title" and the fact that Congress
made no mention of conditional sales. Having found that the
claimant had this magic thing, all its usual incidents were held
to follow as a matter of course. The reasoning appears a bit
mechanical.
Fortunately, Judge Learned Hand filed a forceful dissent from
his brethren. He refused to be governed by mere words, and
ridiculed the thought that anyone knows what "legal title"
means. Assimilating the relations resulting from conditional
sales contracts to those existing between chattel mortgagors and
mortgagees, he saw no reason for treating conditional sellers
and mortagagees differently.4 They are, he reasoned, all per-
sons who have interests in the "property of the debtor" and
therefore are creditors within the meaning of the reorganization
statute. Judge Hand's realism may bear fruit eventually. At
least it will pave the way for legislation which will specifically
enact the meaning of his dissent into law. Indeed, such legisla-
tion has already been recommended to Congress.41
39. See In re Lake's Laundry, Inc. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 326.
40. See the dissenting opinion of Bell, J. in In re Pointer Brewing Co.
(C. C. A. 8, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 478.
41. Report of the counsel to the chairman of the special committee to
investigate receivership and bankruptcy proceedings and administration of
justice in United States Courts, Sen. Doc. No. 268, 56. The Chandler Act
is silent on the matter, however. In railroad reorganizations the right of
the conditional seller to reclaim the property is expressly recognized. See
sec. 77 (j) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. A. (1937) sec. 205 (j).
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One more recent decision 42 seems to follow the rule that a
seller is entitled to reclaim, but it should be noted that the court
in this case ordered the trustee to liquidate the debtor pursuant
to subdivision (k) of section 77B, 11 U. S. C. A (1937) section
207 (k) .4 Given the fact that the court properly ordered a liqui-
dation, no objection can be made to the decision. When a liquida-
tion is ordered, the proceeding becomes in substance a regular
bankruptcy proceeding rather than one for the reorganization
of the debtor. The going values are properly disregarded, for it
is not proposed to keep the business functioning.
The recent case of In re Pointer Brewing Co.4" deserves special
mention. In the cases discussed above there was no question as
to the validity of the contract, the priority of the seller, and his
right to repossess the property in case of a straight bankruptcy
proceeding. The problem was whether a different holding should
be made in the event the proceeding was to effectuate a reorgani-
zation. In the Pointer case, however, the contract of conditional
sale had not been recorded as required by the laws of Iowa. The
court apparently assumed that the seller was a creditor, and
passed upon the problem of whether or not the creditor was
secured. In the cases involving valid conditional sales contracts,
those who feel that the seller should not be permitted to re-
possess the property no doubt would have no objection to the
seller being entitled to the status of a secured creditor. The
holder of a valid chattel mortgage is not entitled to foreclose his
lien and purchase the property, but he is entitled to the status
of a secured creditor. That is a problem in classification of
claims, which is beyond the scope of this paper. The court in the
Pointer case, having held the contract of sale valid as against the
42. In re Collins Hosiery Mills, Inc. (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1937) 19 F. Supp.
500.
43. Bankruptcy Act (1934) 48 Stat. 917, c. 424, sec. 77B, 11 U. S.
C. A. (1937) 207 (c) provides: "[The judge] if a plan of reorganization
is not proposed or accepted within such reasonable period as the judge may
fix, or, if proposed and accepted, is not confirmed, may, after hearing,
whether the proceeding be voluntary or involuntary, either extend such
period or dismiss the proceeding under this section or, except in the case
of a railroad or other public utility or of a debtor which has not been
found by the judge to be insolvent, direct the estate to be liquidated, or
direct the trustee or trustees to liquidate the estate, appointing a trustee
or trustees if none shall previously have been appointed, as the interests
of the creditors and stockholders may equitably require; * * *." See also
clause (k). See Chandler Act, secs. 236-238.
44. (C. C. A. 8, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 478.
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trustee, then gave the seller the status of a secured creditor. Is
this holding contrary to the other cases in which the seller was
held entitled to repossess the property? There is no showing that
the seller asked for such relief. Apparently he was satisfied to
leave his property in the reorganized business upon being recog-
nized as a secured claimant. The court arrived at its conclusion
through an analysis of section 67a of the Bankruptcy Act (11
U. S. C. A. (1937) section 107 (a)) prior to the enactment of the
Chandler Act. It emphasized that under Iowa law the "want of
record" referred to in the statute did not render the lien invalid.
Since the enactment of the Chandler Act, the decision would
probably have to be otherwise. The provisions in sections 60a
and 67d (5), relating to the perfection of transfers, evince a
purpose to give the trustee the status of a bona fide purchaser
for value. Under the present statute the trustee prevails so long
as the transferee could convey rights to a bona fide purchaser
superior to the rights of the transferor. In the instant case, so
long as the contract remained unrecorded the buyer could convey
rights to a bona fide purchaser superior to those of the seller.
So the trustee should prevail45
Frequently, a debtor in failing circumstances continues to add
to its stock of goods, knowing its desperate financial condition.
The debtor under such circumstances knows that its promise to
pay is not likely to be fulfilled. When such situations occur in
regular bankruptcy proceedings, the seller is entitled to reclaim
the property as owner, instead of being required to share in the
assets as a mere creditor. 46 The theory is that the goods have
been tortiously obtained, and that as against the vendee the
vendor is entitled to insist that the title did not pass.4 7 If the
goods are mere additions to the debtor's stock in trade and the
same are clearly identifiable, the seller should be entitled like-
wise to reclaim the goods in a reorganization proceeding.48 If
45. Cf. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Thompson (C. C. A. 8, 1939) 106 F.(2d) 217, rev'd (1940) 309 U. S. 478.
46. California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo (C. C. A. 2, 1933) 62 F. (2d)
528, 530; In re Henry Siegel Co. (D. C. D. Mass. 1915) 223 Fed. 369. See
Hanna, Cases on Creditors' Rights (2d. ed. 1935) 1061, 1074, on reclama-
tion proceedings, especially In re P. H. Krauss & Co. (D. C. W. D. Tenn.
1924) 2 F. (2d) 999.
47. Thurston v. Blanchard (1839) 39 Mass. 18, 33 Am. Dec. 700, allowed
the seller to maintain trover.
48. In re James Butler Grocery Co. (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1935) 10 F.
Supp. 809.
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the property is in the nature of fixed capital and in use as an
integral part of the debtor's business the problem becomes more
difficult. Its withdrawal might prove embarrassing to the re-
organizers, for the lack of a machine might stop production
entirely.
It is not uncommon for financially embarrassed business cor-
porations to borrow necessary capital by pledging some assets
as security. The relation of the pledgees to reorganization pro-
ceedings presents some knotty problems. Pledgees naturally de-
sire to withdraw the pledged property entirely so as to insure
their reimbursement for the money advanced when it becomes
due and payable. While the pledgee has possession and the right
to sell the pledged assets on default of the borrower, the pledgor
has the legal title, and the right to redeem the pledge. The
debtor's interest is somewhat different from that which he has
in conditional sales contracts, for the possession passes from the
debtor to the pledgee in cases of pledge. But in both situations
the debtor is entitled to redeem the property.49 It has a real
interest in that property. And it can be argued logically that
the pledgee has an interest in the "property of the debtor." It
should follow that he is a creditor within the statutory language.
In Weisstein Bros. & Survol v. Laugharn,5° the debtor had sold
some canned fruit to the claimant, which at the time of the con-
tract of sale was in possession of a warehouse company. The
latter company held as agent for a bank which was pledgee, to
secure a debt of the debtor to the bank. The court decided that
the purchaser was not entitled to the fruit which had been validly
pledged, but was only entitled to fie a general claim for its value.
The bank's lien was perfectly good, and it was immaterial that
the claimant had bought without notice that the property was
the subject of a prior pledge. Of course, the decision merely
involves the rights of the purchaser as against the trustee. The
rights of the trustee (and the debtor) as against the pledgee are
not discussed, yet the opinion represents a tacit recognition of
the pledgee's rights.
49. In re Brown (D. C. D. Me. 1936) 14 F. Supp. 251. One of the two
reasons given by the judge for holding that the seller could not reclaim
goods sold on a conditional sales contract was that the right of redemption
of the debtor was property that passed to the trustee in a reorganization
proceeding.
50. (C. C. A. 9, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 419.
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A clash between two groups of beneficiaries of a pledge de-
veloped in In re National Public Service Corporation." The
debtor had deposited stock as collateral to secure debentures
which the court found to be much greater in amount than the
value of the collateral. A regular bankruptcy proceeding was
instituted and the court entered an order terminating the rights
of the debtor and its trustee in the pledged property. The
trustee of the pledged stock then proceeded to try to sell the
stock. Eight months later some of the debenture holders filed
an involuntary petition to reorganize the debtor. The court, by
Judges Chase and A. Hand, ruled that the prior order relative
to the pledged collateral was final notwithstanding that 66 per
cent of the debenture holders voted in favor of the proposed
reorganization plan. The clash was thus between the trustee of
the pledged property and one-third of the beneficiaries on one
hand and two-thirds of the beneficiaries on the other. The dis-
senting judge believed that the will of the larger number of the
real parties in interest should have the controlling voice. He
emphasized several basic considerations. He called attention to
the peculiar nature of the court's jurisdiction under the statute,
pointing out that it is given full control "of the debtor and its
property wherever located." He reasoned that the debtor's in-
terest in the pledged collateral gave the court jurisdiction and
the power to restrain the enforcement of foreclosure rights over
the debtor's property. He examined the fundamental purposes
of the statute and concluded that there was ample power to be
exercised in the conservation of assets for the continuation of
the business, and that even the lienholders, those whose claims
were secured by the pledge, were entitled under the statute to
vote to stay with the business and take their chances on the
future instead of facing the immediate dismemberment and
liquidation of their interests. We still have to wait for the case
in which all the beneficiaries seek to keep the property for them-
selves.
The cases involving conditional sales,52 reservations of unex-
ercised options,53 the properties of subsidiaries of debtors, 4 as
51. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1936) 18 F. Supp. 293, aff'd (C. C. A. 2, 1937)
88 F. (2d) 19, cert. den. (1937) 301 U. S. 697.
52. In re Lake's Laundry, Inc. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 326, 102
A. L. R. 247.
53. In re Prudence Bonds Corp. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 212.
54. In re Adolf Gobel, Inc. (C. C. A. 2, 1936) 80 F. (2d) 849.
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well as pledged collateral,"5 all indicate a willingness to permit
claimants to take away from the debtor concern, some assets
which under a more purposive interpretation of the statute could
be said to be "property of the debtor." The dissenting judge in
the last case cited referred to the property interests involved as
too remote. Other cases point in the same direction. Thus,
where a claimant has contracted to purchase land from a debtor,
the reorganization proceeding will not defeat the claimant's right
to specific performance of the contract. 6 It is conceivable that a
decree of specific performance against a debtor in process of
reorganization may hamper such process seriously. Likewise,
where the debtor had deposited a sum of money to abide the
result of an arbitration proceeding, such fund could not be dis-
turbed. It had to remain intact pending the arbitration.-5 The
deposit had been made more than a year before the filing of the
reorganization petition, and the court treated the situation as
analogous to an attachment of the debtor's property which is
made more than four months prior to the institution of bank-
ruptcy proceedings. No emphasis was placed upon the provision
in the statute for the disturbance and alteration of valid liens.
It seems too that in case the debtor has received an amount of
money to be refunded to a buyer on the happening of a contin-
gency, the buyer is entitled to the refund on the happening of
the event. 8
Not all efforts to take away property from the debtor succeed,
however. Where a debtor was under contract to sell some sardine
oil and meal, and disaffirmed the contract, the buyer sought to
obtain possession of oil and meal in the debtor's possession which
the debtor was threatening to sell to others. The buyer claimed
an equitable interest in the property. The court denied the claim
and held that the mere showing of a refusal to perform an
executory contract for the sale of some unidentified meal and
oil could not be made the basis of a separable interest in that
property. 5
55. In re Natl Public Service Corp. (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 19.
56. Rowan v. Harburney Oil Co. (C. C. A. 10, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 122.
57. In re Grain Producers Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1937) 20 F. Supp.
134.
58. Casey Jones, Inc. v. Texas Textile Mills (C. C. A. 5, 1937) 87 F.
(2d) 434.
59. Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. American Marine Products Co. (C. C.
A. 9, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 380.
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Prior to the passage of the reorganization statute, the Bank-
ruptcy Act preserved to the lienor all rights which he had under
state law,6" but it was generally understood that the bankruptcy
court had the power to restrain the lienor in the enforcement of
his rights. For example, the holder of a lien has been denied the
right to start a foreclosure suit in a state court after bankruptcy
proceedings have been instituted."' The reasoning by which this
disturbance of vested rights was explained emphasized the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to act in the interest
of all the parties and for the better preservation of the rights of
both the unsecured and secured creditors. Moreover, the general
equity jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts, it was said, gave them
such powers. 2 Upon the same basis, they have ordered the sale
of property subject to liens free and clear of such liens. 3 These
powers were always exercised within a very narrow compass,
however. The power to sell free and clear of liens can be exer-
cised only when there is a reasonable prospect that a surplus
will be available for general creditors.64 Foreclosure suits which
have been started prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy
may be continued, and if the mortgagee has been in possession
for four months prior to the beginning of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, such possession may not be disturbed. In like manner,
the court lacks the power to restrain the sale of pledged property
by the pledgee.65
The reorganization statute gives the courts additional powers
with reference to liens. 6 The claims of secured creditors may
60. Hiscock v. Varick Bank of New York (1906) 206 U. S. 28.
61. Straton v. New (1931) 283 U. S. 318; Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber
Co. (1931) 282 U. S. 734; Note (1932) 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 412; Note(1932) 41 Yale L. J. 445; Comment (1931) 16 Minn. L. Rev. 94; Comment(1932) 7 Ind. L. J. 502; Comment (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 1036.
62. Continental Bank v. Rock Island Ry. (1935) 294 U. S. 648. See
Securities & Exchange Comm. v. United States Realty & Improvement Co.
(1940) 60 S. Ct. 1044.
63. Seaboard Nat'l Bank v. Rogers Milk Products Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1927)
21 F. (2d) 414. The proceeds of the sale remained subject to the lien, of
course.
64. Ibid. See In re Natl Grain Corp. (C. C. A. 2, 1926) 9 F. (2d) 802,
803; In re Harralson (C. C. A. 8, 1910) 179 Fed. 490, 492, 29 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 737; Remington, Bankruptcy (3d ed. 1923) sec. 3583.
65. Hiscock v. Varick Bank (1906) 206 U. S. 28; Taubel-Scott-Kitz-
miller Co. v. Fox (1924) 264 U. S. 426, 433, 434; In re Prudence Bonds
Corp. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 75 F. (2d) 262, 263: "A pledgee in possession of
the pledge may stand aside from the ordinary bankruptcy proceeding;" per
L. Hand, J.
66. (1935) 294 U. S. 648. In Grand Boul. Inv. Co. v. Strauss (C. C. A.
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be modified or altered. The Supreme Court of the United States
has given effect to the statutory power several times, e. g., in
Continental Bank v. Rock Island RY. 67 Several decisions in the
lower federal courts shed considerable light on the problem. In
Grand Boulevard Investment Co. v. Strauss,8 the court ordered
the transfer of possession of mortgaged property from the mort-
gagee to the debtor, although the mortgagee had been in posses-
sion over two years. The court applied the reasoning of the
Rock Island case, in which the sale of pledged collateral was re-
strained. In In re Prudence Bonds Corporation,69 the debtor
corporation had pledged some bonds and mortgages to a trustee
to secure its collateral bonds. The holders of some of the debtor's
bonds brought suit against the trustee of the collateral for an
accounting of the income from the bonds and mortgages which
were the subject of the pledge, and further sought to protect his
possession of the bonds. The bankruptcy court restrained the
prosecution of the suit on the theory that its continuance might
impede the progress of the reorganization, or prevent it en-
tirely." It also held that the pledgee was a creditor of the
pledgor within the language of the statute. Judge Learned
Hand in the course of the opinion pointed out that the plaintiffs
who were restrained were merely asserting the rights of the
beneficiaries of the trust in accordance with the deed, and that
8, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 180, it is said at page 184: "The same [power with
reference to liens] is shown, we think, by such provisions in Section 77B
as the following:" (see section 216 of the Chandler Act). The opinion
continues at length upon the special powers conferred by the reorganization
statute.
67. (1935) 294 U. S. 648, 676, 683 (case involved section 77, but same
reasoning applies to section 77B). Foust v. Munson S. S. Lines (1936)
299 U. S. 77.
68. (C. C. A. 8, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 180, 185, it was said: "Our conclu-
sions are that the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in proceedings
under section 77B has been extended by sections 77A and 77B so that it
includes all of the property of the debtor, wherever located, even if such
property is in the possession of a lienholder, and even if such possession
has continued for more than four months prior to the initial petition of
the debtor under section 77B; and that the trial court had jurisdiction to
entertain the petition here in controversy; and in the exercise of its dis-
cretion, to grant or deny the prayer of said petition upon the merits there-
of.
"We think the views expressed in the foregoing opinion find support in
the Rock Island Case heretofore cited; and also in the case of In re Grey-
ling Realty Corporation (C. C. A.) 74 F. (2d) 734. See also, In re Nine-
teenth & Walnut Streets Corp. (D. C.) 9 F. Supp. 625."
69. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 75 F. (2d) 262.
70. In re Adolf Gobel, Inc. (C. C. A. 2, 1936) 80 F. (2d) 849.
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the trustee of the pledged property was trying to pave the way
for its surrender. If the property had not been involved in a
reorganization proceeding, the plaintiff should have prevailed
against the trustee. However, section 77B contemplated the
repudiation of old arrangements. This was so, the judge pointed
out, by virtue of the provision which permitted a two-thirds
majority to coerce the minority and force a new arrangement
upon it. Hence it was necessary to preserve the pledge so that
in case a reorganization plan was accepted the property would
be available for use in the new corporate life. The decision pre-
serves the rights of a statutory majority who prefer to remain
with the concern and look to the future. Dissenting minorities
must submit to the will of the greater number. The case is not
authority for the proposition that a debtor corporation is entitled
to retain pledged assets as a matter of right. In such cases the
assets will be retained in the business only if in the future the
requisite number of those beneficially interested therein decide
to leave them there.
The power to stay creditors, 7' while broadly given to the fed-
eral courts under section 77B (c) of the Bankruptcy Act, and
sections 115 and 116 (4) of the Chandler Act, is largely within
the discretion of the court and must be exercised in relation to
the particular circumstances in each case so as to do justice to
the claimants, the debtor, and the estate. 7 In such cases the
burden is upon the debtor and trustees in reorganization to prove
that the estate would be affected unjustly, and in the absence of
such a showing the injunction should be denied. It should be
granted to facilitate reorganizations, fulfilling the underlying
congressional purpose.73 A majority of the persons interested in
the pledged property are entitled to vote on proposed plans and
determine for themselves whether they will continue with the
concern or take the "adequate protection" granted them by the
statute. Another phase of this problem can only be mentioned
in this paper. The rights of the pledgees are dependent on what
classification of claims the court makes. If pledgees are placed
in a separate class, by themselves, they can proceed under the
71. The power to stay creditors' suits is referred to here because it is
closely related to the power of the court over the debtor's property. See
cases cited supra note 67.
72. Foust v. Munson S. S. Lines (1936) 299 U. S. 77, 83.
73. Continental Bank v. Rock Island Ry. (1935) 294 U. S. 648, 676.
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broad principle of self-determination. Should they, by any
chance, be linked with other claimants whose interests are differ-
ent, even adverse, their rights as pledgees could very well be
dissipated.74
Parties having claims against a debtor occasionally seek to
protect themselves by urging that the debtor stands in the rela-
tion of trustee to them; that the property involved really belongs
to them. If they can identify the trust property they thereby
make themselves clear outsiders. If the relationship is truly of a
fiduciary nature, the beneficiaries should prevail. Sometimes the
distinction between the debtor-creditor relationship and the fidu-
ciary one-is very slight. Where a claimant arranged with a
debtor to conduct a fur department in the debtor's place of busi-
ness, and the debtor collected money which really belonged to the
claimant, the court arrived at the conclusion that the relationship
was that of debtor-creditor by noting that the agreement of the
parties did not provide for the segregation of the amount col-
lected, that the cash sales and the charge accounts involved credit
periods, and that the money went into a general fund.75 A very
interesting similar situation is presented through the complicated
relationships found in the Prudence Bond Corporation cases.
76
The Prudence Bond Corporation was engaged in purchasing
bond issues of corporations which subsequently became debtors
in reorganization proceedings. The issues were secured by deeds
of trust. After such purchases the Prudence Bond Corporation
would issue its own participation certificates, which entitled the
holders to proportionate shares in the whole number of bonds so
purchased. The question presented in In re The Westover was
whether the holders of these participation certificates issued by
the Prudence Bond Corporation, a separate entity, were creditors
of the debtors who had issued the original bonds.. The courts an-
swered it affirmatively. The underlying reasons for such hold-
ing, however, were not carefully analyzed. The decision in the
74. The matter of classification of claims presents a most important
study in itself.
75. In re Martin's (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1935) 11 F. Supp. 99, citing:
Isaac McLean Sons Co. v. William S. Butler & Co. (D. C. D. Mass. 1913)
208 Fed. 730; Harvey Brokerage Co. v. Ambassador Hotel Corp. (D. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1932) 1 F. Supp. 660, 57 F. (2d) 727.
76. In re The Westover (C. C. A. 2, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 177; In re
Prudence Bonds Corp. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 212. The Westover
case was held to be ruled by the Prudence Bond case.
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Westover case was rested upon an earlier Prudence Bond Cor-
poration case. 77 In the latter case, however, the debtor was not
the original issuer of the bonds, but rather the purchaser and
guarantor of those bonds. Accordingly, the certificate holders
had no claim based on any original obligation of the debtor to
pay the principal of the certificates, or interest thereon. The
debtor was only secondarily liable and any interest in the secu-
rity would probably have to be worked out on the theory of sub-
rogation. Under section 77B, "securities" were defined as includ-
ing certificates of beneficial interest in the property of the debtor.
This is still true under section 106 (1) and (11) of the Chandler
Act. Hence the problem is to find whether the debtor has any
property interest in the mortgage which is security for the bene-
ficial certificates. In the Westover case the debtor undoubtedly
had an interest in the property because it was the mortgagor,
and the holders of the certificates could readily trace their in-
terest in that same property to the extent that such certificates
represented fractional ownership in the mortgage.
The status of landlord's claims for future rent, the rent to
become due for the unexpired, executory residue of leases at the
time of the filing of the petition, has received the attention of
judges, legal critics and legislators for some years." Under sec-
tion 63 of the regular Bankruptcy Act (prior to the amendments
of 1933 and 1934), enumerating provable debts, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Manhattan Prop-
erties Inc. v. Irving Trust Co.,79 such claims were not provable
77. In re Prudence Bonds Corp. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 212.
78. Manhattan Properties, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co. (1934) 291 U. S.
320, comment (1934) 28 Ill. L. Rev. 963, comment (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev.
554; Schwabacher and Weinstein, Rent Claims in Bankruptcy (1934) 33
Col. L. Rev. 213; Note (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 143; Note (1932) 41 Yale
L. J. 894; Note (1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 664; Douglas and Frank, Land-
lords' Claims in Reorganizations (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 1003-1007.
79. (1934) 291 U. S. 320. In this case the lease still had five years to
run, the total rent reserved for the unexpired part was $58,000, and the
claimant asserted that the present rental value for the remainder of the
term was $33,000. He accordingly filed a claim for $25,000, the difference
between the rent reserved and the present rental value. The lease con-
tained a covenant that upon certain contingencies, one of which was the
institution of bankruptcy proceedings, the landlord might re-enter the
premises without notice, obtain possession, and re-let as agent for the
tenant, and the tenant agreed specifically to pay the deficit accruing each
month. In In re Roth & Appel (C. C. A. 2, 1910) 181 Fed. 667, a land-
lord was denied the right to prove a claim for future rent on the ground
that it was contingent, but the reasoning on this theory was held faulty
in the case of Maynard v. Elliott (1931) 283 U. S. 273. Supporting the
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Azuditoriunt Association.-5 The difference may be great enough
to prevent that decision from controlling the cases involving
unaccrued rent. The same differences would justify Congress in
limiting landlords to a mere three years' rent. It has been sug-
gested that if land values should rise immediately following a
depression and before the end of a long term lease, the landlord
might make a new lease advantageously after having filed his
claim for a large amount in the bankruptcy proceeding. 8 It
must also be noted that if the landlord is enriched it is usually
at the expense of other creditors. Landlord's claims usually ex-
ceed the claims of all other creditors. s 7 The great danger of
having a landlord's claim dominate the creditors' was obvious in
a recent case involving a railroad lease for 999 years.8 8 The
judge in this case emphasized the underlying policy so noticeably
lacking in the Supreme Court's decision in the Manhattan Prop-
erties case.8 9
The depression flooded the bankruptcy courts with cases in-
volving this problem. Large corporations operating in many
states under numerous leases found themselves tied up with long
term leases and unable to pay rent. Their bankruptcy left prop-
erty owners with claims for future rent which were not provable
and lessees with debts which were not dischargeable. Lessors
realized that their long term lease at high rentals were valuable
only so long as the lessees remained solvent and prosperous. The
Uited Cigar Stores cases" furnish ample evidence of the extent
85. (1916) 240 U. S. 581.
86. Note (1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 664, 670: "The mechanical rationaliza-
tions of the cases suggest that certain unexpressed but none the less moti-
vating considerations of policy underlie the decisions."
87. Suppose a lease still has fifty years to run at a rental of $10,000
and that in depression times the rental value of the property is $2,000 per
year. In this situation the landlord could file for the difference between
the present worth of the contract rentals and the discounted value of the
term at depression prices. It is obvious that if land values rise sometime
during the fifty year period, the landlord will be able to make a new lease
at higher prices and make a substantial profit at the expense of other
creditors. See Note (1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 664, at 670: "The size of his
[landlord's] demand plus its speculative aspect might well prompt a court
to refuse proof."
88. In re New York, N. H. & H. R. R. (C. C. A. 2, 1938) 95 F. (2d)
483, 486, rev'd (1939) 305 U. S. 493.
89. Manhattan Properties, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co. (1934) 291 U. S.
320.
90. Schwartz v. Irving Trust Co. (1937) 299 U. S. 456, 458. The court
points out that in August, 1932, when the United Cigar Stores Co. was
adjudicated a voluntary bankrupt there were in force about 1,000 leases
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to which these difficulties permeated the country. It was desir-
able to settle these claims all at once. The result was the passage
of an amendment to section 63 of the Bankruptcy Act in June,
1934.91 The Chandler Act retains this provision.
The seriousness of the problem is evidenced by the fact that
the new provisions were made applicable to cases pending when
the amendment was passed. It provided in ordinary bankruptcy
cases for the proof of claims for damages arising out of execu-
tory contracts for future rents, but only to the extent of an
amount not exceeding the rent reserved by the lease without
acceleration for the year next succeeding the date of the sur-
render of the premises plus the unpaid rent up to such date.
This legislation settled all related matters. It discharged the
debtor entirely, while granting the lessor a very limited proof.
Long term leases are not much more valuable than under the
rule of the Manhattan Properties case denying their proof for
any amount. Such legislation seems to favor the debtor. The
property owner must still carry the burden of the business
dangers which lurk in the uncertain future.
The reorganization provisions of the bankruptcy act were
passed at about the same time as the amendment to section 63
which we have just discussed, and the provision with reference
to future rents appearing in section 77B is similar to the amend-
under which it held real estate. The following are just a few of the cases
involving this same corporate debtor all before the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, second circuit: (1934) 70 F. (2d) 263; (1934) 70 F. (2d) 313;
(1934) 71 F. (2d) 1018; (1934) 72 F. (2d) 673; (1934) 73 F. (2d) 296;
(1935) 78 F. (2d) 691; (1936) 82 F. (2d) 744; (1936) 82 F. (2d) 247;
(1936) 83 F. (2d) 202; (1936) 83 F. (2d) 207; (1936) 83 F. (2d) 209;
(1936) 83 F. (2d) 1019; (1936) 85 F. (2d) 11; (1936) 85 F. (2d) 94;
(1936) 85 F. (2d) 134; (1936) 86 F. (2d) 629; (1937) 89 F. (2d) 3.
91. "(a) Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his
estate which are * * * (7) Claims for damages respecting executory con-
tracts including future rents whether the bankrupt be an individual or a
corporation, but the claim of a landlord for injury resulting from the
rejection by the trustee of an unexpired leave of real estate or for damages
or indemnity under a covenant contained in such lease shall in no event
be allowed in an amount exceeding the rent reserved by the lease, without
acceleration, for the year next succeeding the date of the surrender of the
premises plus an amount equal to the unpaid rent accrued up to said date:
Provided, That the court shall scrutinize the circumstances of an assign-
ment of future rent claims and the amount of the consideration paid for
such assignment in determining the amount of damages allowed assignee
hereunder: Provided further, That the provisions of this clause (7) shall
apply to estates pending at the time of the enactment of this amendatory
Act in which the time for filing such claims has not expired." (1934) 48
Stat. 923, c. 424, 11 U. S. C. A. (1937) sec. 103.
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ment of section 63 in this regard, except for the fact that the
maximum amount recoverable is set at the amount reserved by
the terms of the lease for three years succeeding the date of
surrender of the premises or of the landlord's re-entry, instead
of one year.9 2 In railroad reorganization cases, section 77 allows
damages according to equitable principles.
9 3
Several decisions involving the construction of this provision
of section 77B have reached the Supreme Court of the United
States. Its constitutionality has been sustained. 4 In City Bank
Farmers' Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,95 it was held that the
language of section 77B gave a landlord a provable claim even
though the lease contained no covenant making the bankruptcy
of the lessee an anticipatory breach of the contract. The pur-
pose of the statute was to give the landlord a provable claim
whether the instrument contained such a covenant of indemnity
or not. Moreover, the right to prove such a claim was held un-
92. (1934) 48 Stat. 915, c. 424. "The claim of a landlord for injury
resulting from the rejection of an unexpired lease of real estate or for
damages or indemnity under a covenant contained in such lease shall be
treated as a claim ranking on a parity with debts which would be provable
under section 63 (a) of this Act, but shall be limited to an amount not
to exceed the rent, without acceleration, reserved by said lease for the
three years next succeeding the date of surrender of the premises to the
landlord or the date or reentry of the landlord, whichever first occurs,
whether before or after the filing of the petition, plus unpaid rent accrued
up to such date of surrender or reentry: Provided, That the court shall
scrutinize the circumstances of an assignment of future rent claims and
the amount of the consideration paid for such assignment in determining
the amount of damages allowed assignee hereunder."
93. See sec. 77 of the Bankruptcy Act (1934) 48 Stat. 911, c. 424 prior
to the passage of the Chandler Act. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co. v.
Palmer (1939) 305 U. S. 493, rev'g In re New York, N. H. & H. R. R. (C. C.
A. 2, 1938) 95 F. (2d) 483.
94. Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co. (1937) 299 U. S. 445, comment (1937)
4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 493. The constitutionality was questioned upon several
grounds: (1) It was an unreasonable classification, limiting a landlord's
recovery below that of other creditors similarly injured; and provided for
equal recovery to landlords unequally injured. (2) It involved a denial
of due process, since it denied full satisfaction of a landlord's claim while
preserving an interest in the stockholders of the debtor. All these argu-
ments were disposed of. There was a major objection to putting landlords
on equal footing with other creditors, because their interest was usually
speculative. The proper measure of damages is the difference between the
fair rental value of the premises for the term remaining and the dis-
counted value of the rent reserved. See Leo v. Pearce Stores Co. (D. C.
E. D. Mich. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 340. The longer the term, the greater the
difficulty of estimating the damages accruing. This is even worse in times
of depression. All in all, the three year rule of thumb is not unreasonable.
The due process argument was more difficult to overcome.
95. (1937) 299 U. S. 433.
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affected by the fact that the leasehold was terminated after the
lease had been rejected by the trustee. Hence even though the
leasehold estate has been merged pursuant to a surrender under
state law, or otherwise terminated, the landlord may neverthe-
less prove his claim. The amount for which the landlord may
prove is again stated to be the "difference between the rental
value of the remainder of the term and the rent reserved, both
discounted to present worth." 96 That .is the general rule of the
measure of damages, which must always be read in connection
with the statutory limit.9T Therefore, the lack of a covenant of
indemnity, the effective termination of the lease by its surrender,
a re-entry of the lessor, and even a reletting by the lessor, will
not prevent him from fling his claim. Is there any way in
which he may lose his claim? We proceed to consider that
problem.
In Schwartz v. Irving Trust Co., 98 it was held that if a land-
lord takes a release for adequate consideration, he thereby pre-
cludes himself from filing any claim. The landlord had entered
into an agreement with the debtor and his trustee by which he
released the trustee from all liability with respect to the lease
and such sub-leases as might have been made by the lessee, in-
cluding all claims in respect of rent and use or occupation. Such
a release by itself would have operated to prevent the landlord
from proving the claims, but for the fact that in the instant case,
the releases contained reservations of the right to file proof of
claim pursuant to the statute. Similarly, it was held in Meadows
v. Irving Trust Co.99 that if a lease contains definite stipulations
setting forth what shall be deemed full compensation for losses
due to the termination of the leasehold, and such conditions are
fulfilled, the landlord's claim is barred. In that case the lease
provided that if default should occur and the lessee transferred
his interest in the demised premises with all improvements
thereon, together with all rents, issues, and profits accrued or to
accrue, and all insurance policies upon the buildings or improve-
ments, without compensation therefor to the lessor, such transfer
should constitute full satisfaction of the lessor's right under the
96. This is in accord with the holding in Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co.
(1937) 299 U. S. 445.
97. See (1934) 48 Stat. 915, c. 424.
98. (1937) 299 U. S. 456.
99. (1937) 299 U. S. 464.
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lease. It specifically stated that such transfer was not a penalty,
but amounted to a liquidation of the damages suffered by the
termination of the lease. The lessee having complied with that
condition and having transferred all his interests under the
lease, it was held that such fulfillment of the condition operated
to terminate the' tenant's liability, and to remove any possible
claim which might have been asserted by the landlord. Claims
for unaccrued rent, then, may be effectively released, or they
may be reserved. In each case the problem becomes one of ex-
amining what the parties have done. Where the bankrupt as-
signed his rights to the lessor, it was held that the right to file
a claim was not released, °0 ° as it would have been if the bankrupt
had assigned to a third person with the assent of the lessor. A
re-entry coupled with a reletting may be such a termination of
the lease as to amount to a release and leave nothing for the
trustee to reject.'"' The acceptance of money by the lessor from
the lessee as rent may be deemed a waiver of a prior forfeiture,
preventing the lessor from re-entering, but what constitutes a
waiver is a question of fact in each case. 0 2 It is a matter of
intent. And though the lessor accepts rent as such in full after
breach of the conditions, it will not amount to a waiver if the
lease provides that rent may be received without prejudice.' 3
The lessors' rights are limited usually by the terms of the lease.
If the lessee sublets, the right of the original lessor against the
sub-lessee can rise no higher than the right of the sub-lessor
against him. 04
It frequently occurs that a debtor in reorganization has guar-
anteed the rent obligations of other debtors. In such cases two
questions arise in relation to the liability of the guarantor. What
is the extent of his liability and to whom does it extend? In
100. In re United Cigar Stores Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 621.
See also (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 3, in which a sublessee was to be
liable to the lessor in case of bankruptcy, but this agreement did not oper-
ate as a release.
101. In re Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp. (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 91 F. (2d)
938.
102. In re Walker (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 281. Here the debtor
had paid $1300 to the lessor after a default which entitled the lessor to
re-enter. It was held not a waiver of the forfeiture. L. Hand wrote the
opinion, emphasizing that the payment was not rent, or money due under
the lease.
103. In re Wil-Low Cafeterias (C. C. A. 2, 1938) 95 F. (2d) 306.
104. In re Connecticut Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1938) 95 F. (2d) 311.
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Hippodrome Building Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 105 the lessor leased
a theatre to a subsidiary of the debtor for a term of 17 years at
$150,000 per year. The debtor guaranteed the payment of the
rent. The debtor's trustee rejected the lease. The lessor sub-let
under the provisions of the lease granting him the right to do
so, but he did not terminate the lease. The court permitted proof
only to the extent of three years' rent. The basic principle was
that a guarantor could not be held liable for a greater amount
than his principal. 08
The lessor may find himself a creditor of a guarantor who has
promised a sub-lessor to discharge the rent specifications on be-
half of the sub-lessee. Thus where the debtor had guaranteed to
discharge the rental obligations of a sub-lessee which was a
wholly owned subsidiary of the debtor-guarantor, the original
lessor was held entitled to file its claim against the debtor. This
was true even though the promise was not intended to be for the
claimant's benefit. 0 7 The situation was deemed analogous to that
in which a -grantee of land subject to a mortgage assumes the
mortgage and promises to the mortgagor to pay the obligation
which it secures. In such a situation the mortgagee may in most
states sue the grantee directly. The theory of subrogation is also
mentioned. The reasoning is that if the party to whom the
promise is made is liable to the original lessor, the latter may
reach and enforce the promise to his own debtor. Moreover,
even though the promisee of the guarantor has not covenanted
to pay rent to the original lessor, the existing privity of estate
should be sufficient to entitle the latter to obtain the benefit of
the promise. The privity of estate would arise from the fact
that the sub-lessor remained a lessee after it sub-let and was
bound as an assignee of a lessee in possession.
The status of tort claims in bankruptcy proceedings was
shrouded in uncertainty for many years. The problem neces-
sarily centered around section 63 of the Bankruptcy Act. 08 Fol-
105. (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 753.
106. In re Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp. (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 91 F. (2d)
938.
107. In re Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp. (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 91 F. (2d)
1004.
108. Section 63 of the Chandler Act clarifies the problem of the prova-
bility of tort claims. All tort claims which are reduced to judgment at
the time of the filing of the petition are provable, and, with reference to
claims for damages resulting from negligent conduct of the bankrupt, sec-
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lowing the passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, numerous
efforts were made to establish the provability of tort claims.
These efforts were made along two lines of thought. In the first
place it was argued that section b of section 63, providing for
the liquidation of unliquidated claims, operated to enlarge the
list of provable claims enumerated in part a of section 63. Sec-
ondly, lawyers contended that the language of section 17 of the
Bankruptcy Act, listing claims which are non-dischargeable,
clearly showed that Congress intended to make tort claims prov-
able.10 9 Both of these arguments were set at rest by the Supreme
Court of the United States, the first one in Dunbar v. Dunbar,110
the second in Schall v. Camors.'11 In the latter case the Court
settled the controversial issue and held that a claim for fraud
was not provable. Other tort claims which bankruptcy courts
refused to admit were as follows: claims for the infringement of
a patent,112 and negligence claims not reduced to judgment at
the time of filing of the petition.13 If the tort claim had been
reduced to judgment at the time of the filing of the petition it
was provable, 1 4 but the mere fact that a verdict had been ren-
dered was insufficient.11 5
The strict rule of the Schafl case can be avoided if a contract
implied in fact or law can be found and the tort is waived. If
the wrongdoer has obtained something of value for which an
equivalent price should be paid and on account of which the law
would imply a promise to pay, the claim is provable."'
tion 63a, 11 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1939) sec. 103a provides: "Debts of the
bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate which are founded
upon * * * (7) the right to recover damages in any action for negligence
instituted prior to and pending at the time of the ing of the petition in
bankruptcy."
109. Schall v. Camors (1920) 251 U. S. 239; Crawford v. Burke (1904)
195 U. S. 176; Brown & Adams Co. v. United Button Co. (C. C. A. 3,
1906) 149 Fed. 48; Comment (1920) 15 Ii. L. Rev. 220.
110. (1903) 190 U. S. 340, 350.
111. (1920) 251 U. S. 239.
112. In re Paramount Publix Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1934) 8 F. Supp.
644.
113. In re Kroeger Bros. Co. (D. C. E. D. Wis. 1920) 262 Fed. 463, com-
ment (1922) 1 Wis. L. Rev. 369.
114. Lewis v. Roberts (1925) 267 U. S. 467; Moore v. Douglas (C. C. A.
9, 1916) 230 Fed. 399.
115. In re Ostrom (D. C. D. Miss. 1911) 185 Fed. 988.
116. Clarke v. Rogers (1913) 228 U. S. 534; Schall v. Camors (1920)
251 U. S. 239; Lane v. Industrial Comr. (C. C. A. 2, 1931) 54 F. (2d) 338,
341, 86 A. L. R. 765; Cunningham v. Feinsilver (D. C. D. Mass. 1925) 6
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In June, 1934, sub-section 6 was added to section 63a.117
The amendment rendered it no longer necessary for a negligence
claim to be reduced to judgment as a condition precedent to
provability, provided the action had been instituted prior to the
adjudication and was pending at the time of the filing of the
petition. The amendment applies only to negligence claims, how-
ever. As to all other torts the case of Scluzll v. Camors still con-
trols. The act as amended and as interpreted does not favor the
unliquidated tort claim.
The underlying policies which induced the courts and Congress
to do nothing about the unliquidated claims are not easy to iso-
late. This is especially true since the mere fact that a judgment
has been entered, or a suit for negligence has been started ren-
ders the claim provable. The real nature of the claim is not
changed simply because a judgment has been entered. It is
suggested in the Schall case that bankruptcy laws have dealt
primarily with traders and that pure tort claims are excluded as
not involved in trading. That may be true, but if that is a real
reason, it should make no difference that a judgment has been
entered, for if a creditor holding a judgment for pure fraud files
his claim, and shares in the assets, he is taking money supposedly
belonging to the traders. Again it has been stated that time is
of the essence in bankruptcy administration, and that the hand-
ling of unliquidated claims would delay the distribution of assets
among creditors. 18 That may be a very practical consideration.
Yet courts agree that doubts should be resolved in favor of
provability219
The rule in reorganization proceedings has been quite differ-
ent from the practice in regular bankruptcy cases. Judges have
admitted tort claimants to the full status of creditors with great
freedom. Claims for false arrest and slander, and willful and
F. (2d) 92; In re Paramount Publix Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1934) 8 F.
Supp. 644. See also Stipp v. Doran (C. C. A. 3, 1927) 18 F. (2d) 83;
Johnson v. Barney (C. C. A. 8, 1931) 53 F. (2d) 770; In re S. W. Strauss
& Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1933) 67 F. (2d) 605; In re Internat'l Match Corp.
(C. C. A. 2, 1934) 69 F. (2d) 73; Cawthon v. Bankokentucky Co. (D. C.
W. D. Ky. 1931) 52 F. (2d) 850.
117. 48 Stat. 923, c. 424, sec. 4(a), 11 U. S. C. A. (1937) sec. 103(6').
118. In re Paramount Publix Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1934) 8 F. Supp.
644.
119. Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1915) 236
U. S. 549; Maynard v. Elliott (1931) 283 U. S. 273.
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malicious injury to the person have been held to be both provable
and dischargeable.1 20 A claim against a steamship corporation
under section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act for the wrongful
death of an employee by the alleged negligence of the company is
both provable and dischargeable. 121
The liberality of the courts in allowing these claims is ex-
plained by the broad language of section 77B, defining creditors
to include holders of claims of whatever character, whether or
not such claims would otherwise have constituted provable claims
under the Bankruptcy Act. The courts accept the statement that
the statutory language in this respect is far more comprehensive
than the corresponding section of the old Act.122
The courts have also shown themselves very lenient in per-
mitting tort claimants to liquidate their claims in state courts
without losing their right to file in the reorganization proceed-
ing.12 3 Though the courts possess full power to control such
suits, 124 it is settled that they may be enjoined only upon a show-
ing by the debtor that their prosecution will hinder, burden or
delay reorganization. In the absence of such a showing, the
enjoining of a suit constitutes an abuse of discretion.'125 The
power under subsection c (10) of section 77B or section 116 (4)
of the Chandler Act must be exercised "according to the par-
ticular circumstances" of the case and is to be guided by con-
siderations of what is just to the claimants, the debtor, and the
estate.12 The fact that the debtor carried insurance against the
liabilities involved is also of great importance. If the claimant
needs a judgment to be entitled to such insurance it is an abuse
of judicial discretion to enjoin him from obtaining such a judg-
120. In re McCrory Stores Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1937) 19 F. Supp.
367; In re B. M. 0. Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 652;
Small v. Kiel (C. C. A. 8, 1939) 101 F. (2d) 444.
121. Foust v. Munson S. S. Lines (1936) 299 U. S. 77; In re Adolf
Gobel, Inc. (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 171.
122. In Foust v. Munson S. S. Lines (1936) 299 U. S. 77, the claim was
for the wrongful death of claimant's father, caused by the negligence of
the debtor. The court said, "Undoubtedly, 'creditors', 'claims', and 'liabili-
ties' to be dealt with in the reorganization proceeding include petitioner,
the cause of action he asserts and the judgment he seeks to recover."
123. In re Missouri Gas and Electric Service Co. (D. C. W. D. Mo.
1935) 11 F. Supp. 434.
124. Foust v. Munson S. S. Lines (1936) 299 U. S. 77.
125. Ibid.
126. Id. at p. 83; In re Adolf Gobel, Inc. (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 89 F. (2d)
171.
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ment.127 The claimant should be entitled to file,1 29 unless the
delay is unreasonable.12 9
In railroad reorganizations under section 77, tort claims have
been given priority over mortgages and other claims. Full re-
covery has been allowed both in receivership proceedings, and
under the words of the Act treating such claims as operating
expenses entitled to be paid in full ahead of the funded debts.130
Moreover, in case a state statute gives a prior lien upon the
property of a railroad in favor of persons suffering damages as
a result of its wrongdoing, such lien is given full recognition
over other liens.131 The present policy of allowing liberal proof
of tort claims in reorganizations is undoubtedly essential. All
claimants have a legal right to sue their debtor and levy execu-
tion upon his property, and if all claimants were not brought in
and put under control a reorganized business would not have a
very peaceful existence. Hence the handling of claims in such a
proceeding must be more realistic than in ordinary bankruptcy.
The passage of the Chandler Act has not changed materially
the problem analyzed in these pages. A few minor changes have
been mentioned, but essentially the decisions under section 77B
are still excellent guide posts. In fact they may well be of con-
trolling importance. The effect of having new legislation cutting
across well settled rules of law is uncertainty. Those whose
rights depend upon the sanctity of old rules, hold them up ag
immutable, and opponents favor their abrogation. The position
of the conditional seller in a reorganization proceeding is illus-
trative. Purposive interpretation of the statutes requires the
denial of some well established rights. Gradually, the practice
will evolve fairly clear notions as to what constitutes an interest
in the property of the debtor. It is hoped that this study indi-
cates that certain trends are already discernible. It seems too
early to draw positive conclusions.
127. In re Adolf Gobel, Inc. (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 171.
128. Mack v. Pacific S. S. Lines (C. C. A. 9, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 95,
129. In re McCrory Stores Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1937) 19 F. Supp.
367.
130. Central Hanover Bank v. Williams (C. C. A. 8, 1938) 95 F. (2d)
210; In re Chicago, etc. Ry. (C. C. A. 7, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 312, 113 A. L. R.
487; Thompson v. Siratt (C. C. A. 8, 1938) 95 F. (2d) 214.
131. Thompson v. Glover (C. C. A. 8, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 544.
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